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ABSTRACT  
Developing data-driven fault detection systems for chemical plants requires managing 
uncertain data labels and dynamic attributes due to operator-process interactions. 
Mislabeled data is a known problem in computer science that has received scarce 
attention from the process systems community. This work introduces and examines the 
effects of operator actions in records and labels, and the consequences in the development 
of detection models. Using a state space model, this work proposes an iterative relabeling 
scheme for retraining classifiers that continuously refines dynamic attributes and labels. 
Three case studies are presented: a reactor as a motivating example, flooding in a 
simulated de-Butanizer column, as a complex case, and foaming in an absorber as an 
industrial challenge. For the first case, detection accuracy is shown to increase by 14% 
while operating costs are reduced by 20%. Moreover, regarding the de-Butanizer column, 
the performance of the proposed strategy is shown to be 10% higher than the filtering 
strategy. Promising results are finally reported in regard of efficient strategies to deal 
with the presented problem.  
KEYWORDS: fault detection, mislabeling, label noise, underlying states, operational 
intelligence, interactive learning. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Monitoring of chemical processes, as many other activities, is required for determining 
the need for corrective actions and subsequent efficient operation. Indeed, abnormal 
situation management (ASM) is an essential task for loss prevention and safe operation of 
chemical plants. To achieve this aim, multiple protection layers (Fig. 1) are applied in 
industrial plants as per the international standard IEC61511 (2003), each one consisting 
of equipment and/or administrative controls coordinated with other protection layers 
(Isermann, 1994). Most automatic protection layers are triggered by actuators, while 
sensors’ readings indicate the violation of limiting thresholds. Despite all the progress in 
automatic risk reduction systems (hardware and software), the operator supervision and 
the corrective action in ASM is still indispensable. Indeed, the operator and the automatic 
controls, together, constitute operational intelligence (Rajaram & Jaikumar, 2000).  
 
The fault detection (FD) system is a core component of ASM that has attracted a lot of 
attention recently. Moreover, it is expected to be explicitly included in the standard 
IEC61511 in the near future. In fact, a fault consists of an unpermitted deviation of at 
least one property or parameter of a system from its acceptable, usual or standard 
condition (Isermann & Balle, 1997). FD methods are categorized in three main groups: 
quantitative model-based methods, qualitative model-based methods and data-driven 
methods (Venkatasubramanian, Rengaswamy, Yin, & Kavuri, 2003). Qualitative model-
based FD methods are not often deployed for complex chemical process, because the 
corresponding analytical description is rarely available. In addition, quantitative model-
based FD methods, so-called inference methods, are developed based on explicit 
structural knowledge and causalities (Korbicz, Koscielny, Kowalczuk, & Cholewa, 
2012). These methods, which rely on experts’ knowledge in a specific domain, are often 
costly and time-intensive to obtain. Thus, FD is commonly addressed by process history 
based methods, since for operating plants a large amount of historical process data is 
available (MacGregor & Cinar, 2012; Qin, 2012).  
Data-driven FD systems early developed based on multivariable statistical analysis e.g. 
principal component analysis (PCA) (Lu, Yao, Gao, & Wang, 2005), partial least squares 
(PLS) (Chiang, Braatz, & Russell, 2001). Recently, FD has been considered as a 
classification problem as well, and Machine Learning provides various tools for 
classification, which are categorized below (Isermann, 2006): 
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 Geometric classifier. e.g. k-nearest neighbourhood (kNN) (Pandya, Upadhyay, & 
Harsha, 2013);  
 Probabilistic classifier. e.g. Gaussian naïve Bayes (GNB) (Askarian, et al., 2015; 
Sáez-Atienzar, et al., 2015) and the hidden Markov model (HMM) (Li, Fang, & 
Huang, 2015); 
 Approximation classifier. e.g. polynomial support vector machines (SVM) 
(Danenas & Garsva, 2015; Namdari & JazayeriRad, 2014); 
 Soft computing techniques. e.g. fuzzy classifier (Serdio, Lughofer, Pichler, 
Buchegger, & Efendic, 2014) and artificial neural networks (Duda, Hart, & Stork, 
2001). 
The main advantage of FD using classification methods is the ability at dealing with 
unstructured information and implicit knowledge. However, each method poses some 
limitations that are discussed in detail by Isermann (2006). The major weak point of 
classifiers is vulnerability to mislabeling, which is the issue explored in this work.    
In Machine Learning, the standard approach consists in training a classifier from a 
labeled dataset to predict the class of new samples accordingly. Usually, labels are 
considered given and the labeling process is assumed to be reliable (Bootkrajang & 
Kabán, 2012). However, in industrial practice and process plants, assigning labels to 
training data may need attention and careful examination. Indeed, true labels 
corresponding to the state of system are usually unavailable. Mislabeling may occur for 
several reasons including expert errors, lack of information or data labeling by non-
experts (de França & Coelho, 2015). Label uncertainty is an important issue in 
classification, because most classifiers are built on the hypothesis of a perfectly labeled 
training set. Some Machine Learning literature exist regarding effects of uncertain labels, 
which shows that mislabeling may detrimentally affect the classification performance and 
the reliability of the learned models (Brodley & Friedl, 1999; Frénay, de Lannoy, & 
Verleysen, 2011). 
Numerous methods have been proposed to deal with label noise. Filter approaches aim at 
identifying and removing any mislabeled instances (Brodley & Friedl, 1999; Zhang, Li, 
Yang, & Yong, 2014). A residual-based fault detection is developed which solely relies 
on sensor’s data; and labels required for pattern recognition of fault is not demanded 
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(Serdio, Lughofer, Pichler, Buchegger, Pichler, et al., 2014). Some algorithms are 
naturally robust to label noise (Teng, 2005). Some methods have been modified to take 
label noise into account in an embedded fashion or to model the process of label 
corruption as part of modeling the data (Swartz, Haitovsky, Vexler, & Yang, 2004). The 
current literature on learning with label noise is a lively mixture of theoretical and 
experimental studies that clearly demonstrate both the complexity and the importance of 
the problem. Frénay and Verleysen (2014) comprehensively discussed different families 
of algorithms that have been proposed to deal with label noise.  
A particular case of mislabeled training data occurs while operator-process interactions 
are involved in industrial practice. In case of abnormal events in chemical plants, 
operators take preventive actions as early as possible. On the one hand, one of such 
actions could be taken as an indication of the fault and used for training an automatic 
fault detection system. On the other hand, human error and lack of information about the 
underlying state of the system can mislead the operator, so that an unnecessary action is 
taken. Furthermore, the operator recognition (normal, symptom, fault…) strongly 
depends on his or her personal characteristics and preferences (conservative / risky, 
experienced / untrained etc.). Although the operator is the ultimate decision maker 
regarding ASM, it is an actor interfering the process history, as well. Such a case is of 
special complexity and it is referred as mislabeling, label uncertainty and label noise, as 
addressed in the Machine Learning literature. 
In addition, the dynamic response of a chemical process following a fault and/or an 
operator action increases the complexity of situation (Si, Hu, Yang, & Zhang, 2011). 
Unnecessary actions alter process history and have adverse impacts on attributes of faulty 
and normal situations. Of course, plant decision makers are trading-off the cost of the 
action and the expected loss, and experimenting seems not an option. Nevertheless, 
incorrect interpretation of the system state by the operator causes mislabeling, and his or 
her unnecessary action impacts on the attributes.  
It is worth to mention that most computer science literature dealing with label noise 
interprets noise as an outlier (Frénay & Verleysen, 2014). In other words, mislabeling is 
considered for each instance of attributes. This strategy is appropriate for static problems 
such as image processing. However, fault detection in process systems requires a 
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different approach due to its dynamic behavior. This important aspect has received scarce 
attention in chemical engineering, and it deserves more investigation.  
These challenges motivate the development of a robust strategy for efficiently using the 
training datasets with uncertain labels produced in operating plants by human 
intervention. This strategy should be regarded as a part of a general operators’ decision 
support framework for FD and ASM. Since the main objective is aiding the operator to 
make better decisions, operator actions cannot be readily identified as true faulty labels. 
This will lead to a model of the operator preferences that could anticipate the operator 
actions, not the real process faults. Conversely, questioning the actions and the labels is 
the starting point of the strategy proposed in this work.   
This study mainly discusses about impact of human intervention on FD of a dynamic 
system, which is an unattended topic in the chemical engineering literature, and 
contributes a novel strategy to deal with this situation. The proposed FD approach 
includes a loop for fault detection via three parties -classifier, state space model and 
operator- which successively leads to evolution. The underlying state of the system is 
estimated using a state space model, which takes the advantage of sequential data 
analysis of time series. Then, the deviation from the normal state is characterized by the 
Mahalanobis distance, which eventually allows relabeling attributes. Iterative training of 
the Gaussian naïve Bayes classifier is proposed to improve the operator perception and 
refine attributes. The solution approach provides useful tools for the plant operator to 
assess the need of preventive actions respect to faults. Next, this strategy is validated and 
discussed in three case studies, a reactor, as an illustrative example; the de-Butanizer 
column, as a complex example; and an industrial sweetening unit in a gas refinery as a 
real challenge.  
 
2. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE  
A continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) is a most basic unit operation in chemical 
engineering which is a tank equipped with an impeller. Reactants and products are 
continuously added and withdrawn to the tank where reaction takes place. Mixing with 
impeller is required to achieve uniform composition. A fault and the subsequent operator 
action are simulated in a jacketed, non-adiabatic, and perfectly mixed tank reactor. A 
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single first-order exothermic and reversible reaction of two components, A↔B, takes 
place. A scheme of the equipment module is shown in a Figure 2, as well as input and 
output variables. Volume is assumed to be constant, and inlet and outlet flowrates are 
equal. Density, specific heat and heat of reaction are also assumed constant. Based on the 
mass and energy balances, equations in appendix A.1 are derived for simulation. 
The change of the feed stream concentration or temperature (input variables u1t or u2t, 
respectively) causes the change of the outlet composition and temperature. In order to 
keep the reactor temperature under a specified threshold (320 ºC) the operator can 
decrease the jacket temperature u3t. Although, this problem can be easily solved by using 
a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller, a manual control by the operator is 
discussed to illustrate the problems associated to human decision-making in industrial 
processes. In other words, operator-process interactions are required in open loop 
systems.  The input variables are assumed unobservable to the operator; the only 
information that can be monitored and recorded is that of the output variables. 
Furthermore, the process model is assumed unavailable to the operator, who can only rely 
on the measurement of the reactor temperature to keep it below the limit. 
Scenario 1: CAf has a step change that is considered a fault in the operation. If the 
operator is unaware of the state of system, the reactor temperature will exceed the limit 
(Fig. 3 red line). Therefore, when T increases too fast (> 0.2 ºC/s ), the operator decreases 
Tj, so that T is kept under 320˚C (Fig. 3 blue line). 
Scenario 2: A minor step change in CAf  also increases T too fast, but it remains under the 
specified threshold (Fig. 4 red line). Therefore, it is called pseudo-fault. Since CAf is not 
observable, the conservative operator takes an action based on his or her intuition 
(experience of Scenario 1), although this time it is unnecessary. This is an overuse of 
cooling utility and extra cost. On the other hand, the operator labels the process data of 
this time interval as faulty. In addition, the preventive action changes the trend of 
attributes (Fig. 4 blue line).  
Hence, a robust FD system is expected to reveal pseudo-fault as normal in order to 
prevent unnecessary and expensive action. It is clear that using this raw information for 
designing a classifier will lead to a low FD performance. This performance is quantified 
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in Section 4.1. Although various scenarios can be defined, the scope of this illustrative 
example is limited to decision making by a conservative operator. 
The presented case study leads to a twofold problem: 
 Avoiding bad decisions in case of pseudo-fault produced the extra cost of 
unnecessary preventive actions; 
 Avoiding uncertain labels and attributes that will mislead the automatic diagnosis 
system. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
The initial FD system, which is designed based on basic information (namely attributes 
labeled by the operator), infers the state of the system in a way very similar to operator 
intuition. In other words, careless use of this information leads to model the pattern of 
operator behavior and preferences. Thus, this cannot support successful decision in 
regard of the optimization of the costs corresponding to unnecessary preventive actions or 
potential accidents. An improved strategy is required to deal with mislabeling and the 
subsequent impact of operator actions on attributes (system outputs). 
In order to improve FD performance, retraining with a refined dataset including reliable 
labels and attributes is inevitable. In general, improving operator perception is required to 
provide a chance of producing new datasets. In hindsight and without operator actions, it 
is often much clearer whether the state of system is a pseudo-fault or a risky fault. 
However, the operator is not aware of the underlying state of system, and taking no 
action is risky when perceiving a potential fault. Indeed, taking no action allows further 
learning, but may lead to an accident. On the other hand, the performance of the initial 
FD system is not reliable enough to make decisions based on its prediction. Thus, a 
gradual improvement of the FD system can be achieved by an interactive and iterative 
learning procedure with an acceptable risk at each phase.  
Figure 5 illustrates the interactive strategy proposed for training a classifier, which can 
provide a promising decision support system. It consists of three main parts shown by 
dashed bounding boxes: initializing, re-training, and validating. Rectangular and elliptical 
blocks represent available data and operations on data, respectively. The dotted elliptical 
blocks are flexible and can accept different tools. A grey block represents that it may be 
unavailable in some cases. In following sub-sections, the fundamentals of the most 
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significant blocks involved in this work are explained. They are included the dynamic 
linear model (DLM) to estimate the underlying state; Mahalanobis distance to 
characterize deviations from normal state, Gaussian naïve Bayes (GNB) to classify, a 
validation confusion matrix to evaluate performance, and an interaction index to forward 
to next interactive learning phases. Then, input-output information of these tools is 
demonstrated. Finally, the rules and interaction of these tools are described in the general 
strategy. 
 
3.1. Description of tools 
3.1.1. State space models 
This work proposes to take advantage of the state space model to analyze time series and 
estimate the underlying states of a dynamic system. Given m observations, Yt=(y1t, y2t, …, 
ymt), the n unobservable state variables, θt =(θ1t, θ2t, …, θnt), are recursively computed 
using a state space model. Figure 6 represents the information flow of the state space 
model, which satisfies the following assumptions: 
 θt is a Markov chain. In other words, θt and (θ0:t−2, Y1:t−1) are conditionally 
independent given θt-1; 
 Yt’s are independent conditioned on θt; and Yt depends on θt only (Petris, Petrone, 
& Campagnoli, 2009). 
The dynamic linear model (DLM) is a special case of a general state space model, being 
linear and Gaussian. A DLM is specified by a pair of observation equation and state 
equation: 
 t t t tY F vθ  ~ (0, )t m tv N V                 
1m
tY R

        
m n
tF R

      
1m
tv R

        
m m
tV R
  
(1) 
1 t t t tG wθ θ  ~ (0, )t n tw N W  
1n
t R
θ
         
n n
tG R

      
1n
tw R

       
n n
tW R
  
(2) 
where Gt and Ft are system identification matrices and vt and wt are two independent 
sequences of independent Gaussian random vectors with mean zero and variance 
matrices Vt and Wt, respectively. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is a common 
approach for parameter identification of the model (Petris, et al., 2009).  
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The current value of the state variables can be recursively estimated based on the 
attributes up to time t. In a DLM, the Kalman filter allows updating the current inference 
on the state variables as new data become available (Lendek, Babuška, & De Schutter, 
2008). Passing from the filtering density π(θt|Y1:t) to π(θt+1|Y1:t+1) is fully detailed 
described in appendix A.2.  
 
3.1.2. Mahalanobis distance 
The Mahalanobis distance, DM, of a vector θt =(θ1t, θ2t, …, θnt)T from another group of 
state variables, with mean µ=( µ1, µ2… µn)T  and covariance matrix, Σ, is defined as (Yu, 
2013): 
1( ) ( ) ( )TM t
   t tθ θ μ θ μD  (3) 
 
3.1.3. Gaussian naïve Bayes classifier 
Gaussian naïve Bayes (GNB) classifier is a supervised learning method based on Bayes’ 
theorem that can be applied for fault detection. The probability of each fault as a class 
can be determined regarding attributes as below (Mehranbod, Soroush, Piovoso, & 
Ogunnaike, 2003): 
 
   
 
t
t t
t
Y F F
F Y
Y
 


  (4) 
where π(Yt|F) is the probability of attributes conditioned on the fault F and π(F) is the a 
priori probability, which gives the probability of the class before measuring any 
attributes. The divisor π(Yt) is merely a scaling factor to assure that a posteriori 
probabilities are normalized. 
 
3.1.4. Key performance indicators  
The performance of classifiers is evaluated by comparing predicted faults and true faults. 
In this order, FD outcomes are arranged in a validation confusion matrix (Monroy, Villez, 
Graells, & Venkatasubramanian, 2012) presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Validation confusion matrix  
  True label 
  F ¬F 
Predicted label 
F a b 
¬F c d 
where a is the number of samples corresponding to faulty situations and diagnosed as 
such (true positive); b is the number of samples diagnosed as faulty but were not (false 
positive); c is the number of samples  corresponding to faulty but not diagnosed 
situations (false negative) and d is the number of samples not happened and not 
diagnosed (true negative). Then, performance indexes including accuracy, F1, and true 
positive rate (TPR) are calculated as follows: 
Accuracy
a d
a b c d


     
(5)                                                             
1
2
2
F
a
a b c

   
(6) 
TPR 

a
a c
 (7) 
 
3.1.5. Interaction index 
Due to the unavailability of true labels in real practice, labels estimated by an operator 
and a classifier play some roles in interactive learning of the FD system described in the 
subsequent sections. As such, a comparison of classifier prediction and labels assigned by 
the operator based on his or her intuition is made by an interaction confusion matrix in 
Table 2.  
Table 2: Interaction confusion matrix  
  Operator label 
  F ¬F 
Predicted label 
F a’ b’ 
¬F c’ d’ 
 
where a’ is the number of samples to which the operator and the classifier assign fault 
labels to the state of a system; b’ is the number of samples diagnosed as faulty in contrast 
with operator opinion; c’ is the number of samples corresponding to faulty but not 
11 
 
diagnosed situations; and d’ is the number of samples for which both the operator and the 
classifier agree that no fault happens.  
It is generally agreed that the operator and the automatic FD system are complementary 
for ASM (Sheridan & Johannsen, 1976). However, it is required to take into account the 
conflict between operator labels and classifier predictions to manage uncertain records. 
For instance, a conservative operator hastily assigns a fault to the system regarding any 
minor disturbance or so called pseudo-fault. While the classifier predicts this situation as 
the normal state, it is reflected in c’. On the other hand, a risky operator may not react to 
a faulty situation which is diagnosed as such and is categorized as b’. 
The main idea is to gradually encourage an operator to provide a chance of generating 
more informative dataset, i.e. new trends of attributes in subsequent learning phases. It is 
required to determine to which extent the operator takes no action in potentially faulty 
situations at each phase. Thus, an interaction index is introduced in Eq. 8, which 
quantifies the conflict. 
( )( )interaction
d a
I Accuracy ARL
b d c a
 
  
    
 (8) 
where the first and second terms reflect extremes of risky and conservative operators 
conflicts with a classifier prediction, respectively; and a correction factor consists of 
accuracy of a classifier and ARL corresponding to acceptable risk level of a chemical 
plant. Indeed, the risk level is defined as multiplication of probability and consequence of 
a faulty situation (Bao, Khan, Iqbal, & Chang, 2011). An acceptable risk level depends 
on the type of chemical plants and the policy of owners.  Moreover, note that the various 
classifiers facing ideal datasets (certain labels) have different performance levels. 
Designing an FD system with a high performance classifier, the conflict (i.e. c’ and b’) 
reflects in an interaction confusion matrix is mainly due to wrong human perception. 
Thus, accuracy of classifier is a correction factor of Iinteraction.  
Based on the proposed procedure in Section 3.2, higher Iinteraction encourages more change 
in attributes of datasets in the next learning phase. In fact, this index is the extent of 
changes between learning phases. For example, involving a conservative operator leads 
to higher c’; and higher Iinteraction subsequently. If the classifier has high performance, the 
available interaction confusion matrix is more reliable, and keeps Iinteraction high. On the 
other hand while the chemical process deals with high risk, ARL is low. As such, Iinteraction 
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is adjusted accordingly to specify the acceptable change ratio in the next learning phase. 
In general, Iinteraction is a dynamic index which is updated in any learning phase, and 
specifies speed of learning.  
Finally, a general scheme of these significant blocks and their input-output information is 
represented in Figure 7. Parameters involved in each block as a part of a data-based FD 
system are fitted based on subsets of a typical dataset.   
 
3.2. Iterative and interactive procedure 
The operator continuously needs to make decisions, as well as the training data set can be 
continuously refined. However, in order to make a quantitative assessment, the proposed 
strategy (Fig. 5) is evaluated in different discrete phases in an offline manner. The dataset 
at each phase, Dp, includes attributes of the process system, 1:
rp
TY , and paired labels, 1:
rp
TF , 
as below: 
 1: 1:( , ) | 1: rp rpp T TD Y F r R  p=0,1,2,…,  P (9) 
where T is the time horizon of the rth run; and R is the number of runs included in the pth 
phase. Total number of phases, P, depends on the required iterations. Each phase of data 
is spilt into training and testing subsets.  
Step 1: The initial dataset, Di|i=0, is a collection of R runs paired with operator labels. 
Note that in the initial learning phase, the only information source regarding labels is 
operator. After training the classifier, the predicted labels of the testing subset are 
compared with operator labels (Table 2). In addition, based on the comparison of 
predicted labels with true labels (Table 1), the key performance indicators (KPIs) (Eqs. 5-
6) are evaluated. It should be noted that 1:
rp
TY  and paired true labels of the illustrative case 
study (CSTR) are originated from the process model. Since it is not generally applicable, 
the process model block in Figure 5 is in grey.  
Step 2: The conflict between operator labels and GNB prediction is reflected in Iinteraction 
index (Eq. 8). In the next phase, operator action is taken or not in regard of this ratio, so 
that there is a chance to produce a new dataset at the expense of an acceptable risk level. 
In other words, Di|i=1 includes R×Iinteraction runs without action and R×(1-Iinteraction) runs 
with action when potential faulty situations are faced.  
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Step 3: Parameters of the state model, DLM, are identified using MLE. In fact, DLM 
identification is based on the normal samples predicted by GNB, which is trained in the 
previous learning phase. Then, each attribute sample of Di|i=1, 
rp
tY , is recursively 
projected to θtrp =(θ1t, θ2t, θ3t) using the trained state model to explore the underlying state 
of the system.  
Step 4: Mahalanobis distance, DM, of each sample of the three dimensional state 
trajectories from the predicted normal subset is evaluated. The points beyond a specified 
threshold (median of all points) are labeled as faulty and others are labeled as normal. 
Step 5: After retraining the classifier based on Di|i=0,1, the labels predicted for the 
testing subset.  
Step 6: Gradual refining of Di is achieved by iteratively repeating steps 2-5. 
Finally, it is worth to note that various strategies dealing with mislabeling (Frénay & 
Verleysen, 2014) may be investigated and compared. However, this framework only 
focuses on the impact of human intervention on FD of a dynamic system, which is a new 
topic in the chemical engineering literature. In addition, fault prognostic is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
4.1. CSTR 
In Section 2, the CSTR case study has been introduced to illustrate some problems posed 
to FD by the operator-process interaction. In this section, the proposed data-driven 
algorithm is validated on the database generated by the CSTR model. The time horizon of 
each run is considered 400 s, while the step change (fault and pseudo-fault) happened at 
t=200 s for both scenarios (Figs. 3-4). In the simulation, random noise (in range of ±2%) 
was added to the input variables and propagated to the output variables. In addition, the 
conservative operator takes preventive actions while symptoms of a potential fault 
appear. Thus, operator labels of samples after action are all considered faulty.  
The initial dataset of the CSTR case study is a set of runs as defined below: 
 0 00 1:400 1:400( , ) | 1: 200 r rD Y F r  (10) 
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D0 is spilt into 70:30 ratio for training and testing the classifier. It is notable that true 
labels of samples after action regarding Scenario 1 are faulty, while regarding Scenario 2 
are normal.  
The performance of the trained GNB classifier regarding D0 is assessed in terms of F1 
and accuracy. The result reveals that the initial training phase seems inefficient for FD 
due to low discrimination performance (Table 3). Since the underlying state of system is 
hidden, operator-process interaction is under uncertain condition. Therefore, unnecessary 
preventive actions lead to mislabeling and masked attributes. In addition, based on the 
validation confusion matrix, the extra cost of utility consumption is proportional with the 
false positive rate (FPR) as follows:   
FPR 

b
b d
  (11)                                                             
which means that the operator wrongly distinguishes the situation as faulty and 
unnecessarily reacts. In fact, this initial FD system is not useful for reducing the excess 
cost. The main reason is that GNB emulates the operator behavior, but not the process at 
this iteration.  
Table 3: FD performance using iterative procedure 
 Learning phase Initial 1st  2nd 3rd 4th 
 Iinteraction % 0 5 13 21 32 
F1 Normal 0.82 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.94 
Fault 0.68 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.85 
Accuracy 0.77 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.91 
TPR % 99.16 98.58 98.81 98.95 99.07 
FPR %   Unnecessary 
utility consumption  
30.26 17.79 13.17 11.46 9.51 
FNR %   Accident  0.84 1.42 1.19 1.05 0.93 
 
In order to improve FD performance, it is essential to provide a successive refinement of 
the datasets, including reliable labels and comprehensive attributes. First, the datasets are 
gradually enriched by generating new trends of attributes. Then, labels are automatically 
assigned to skip human error. This goal is achieved by following steps 2-4 of the 
proposed procedure (Section 3.2). Thus, the operator behavior toward the process is 
systematically changed by considering Iinteraction. Because it is assumed that the operator is 
conservative, b’ is equal to zero; and the conflict of the operator and the classifier is 
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limited to c’ (Table 2). Moreover, for sake of simplicity, the correction factor in Eq. 8 is 
considered as one herein. Note complementary scenarios, investigation the effects of ARL 
and classifier accuracy, can be explored in further works; and it is not in line with the 
main goal of the present study. Here, operational intelligence intends to improve process 
operation in terms of reducing unnecessary actions. In this case study, for the first phase 
of retraining, 1
1:400
rY consists of 190 random runs with action and 10 random runs without 
action (95:5 ratio based on Iinteraction). The normal subset is separated by GNB which is 
trained in the initial phase. Then, this subset is used for identification of DLM by MLE in 
the first learning phase. Relabeling the new dataset is accomplished by exploring the 
underlying state of the system. In other words, each sample, 1 3 1r
tY R
 , is projected to
 
1 3 1r
t R
θ . After projecting 11:400
rY to three-dimensional state trajectories, DM is calculated 
for each sample. Most potential faulty samples of Scenarios 1 and 2 can be discriminated 
by a median threshold (Fig. 8). Therefore, 1
1:400
rF consists of fault label for each sample 
that exceeds the threshold and normal label for others.  
The GNB classifier is retrained and tested by 70:30 of available information, {D0, D1} 
respectively. Table 3 shows that significant improvement in terms of F1 and accuracy is 
achieved via the first learning phase, which leads to a reduction of utility consumption as 
well. On the other hand, the accident rate is proportional with the false negative rate 
(FNR) as follows: 
FNR 

c
a c
  (12)                                                             
The accident rate increases, because the operator takes a risk by not responding to some 
potential faulty situations. Indeed, a cost for providing comprehensive information and 
learning is quite reasonable; this is reflected in the accident probability in this case study.  
It is notable that the conflict between the operator and the classifier increases in this 
retraining phase in which Iinteraction is equal to 13%. Indeed, the proposed FD algorithm is 
successful in deviating from the prior operator perception and increasing the accuracy of 
prediction simultaneously. In other words, the FD system classifies the pseudo-fault as 
the normal state, despite the operator idea at the initial phase. It is mainly due to 
reflection the process state rather than the pattern of operator behavior.  
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There is a promotion of iteratively continuing this procedure to refine datasets and 
improve FD performance. In general, using two automatic discrimination tools in parallel 
(DLM and GNB) is complementary, since it reduces misclassification and results more 
reliable for the operator. In fact, the proposed methodology consists in a loop for 
assigning labels via three parties (classifier, state space model and operator), which leads 
to evolutionary improvement of the main learning elements: the data-based models and 
the understanding of the operator. As such, the operator perception regarding the state of 
system is more realistic after this interactive learning process. Table 3 represents the 
accuracy of discrimination of fault by FD system increases in 2nd to 4th retraining phases. 
In other words, the sole classifier is not efficient (note the initial accuracy), and the 
proposed strategy improves FD accuracy. In addition, unnecessary utility consumption 
has decreasing trend, which reveals that the last FD system successfully supports the 
operator in making decisions that are more profitable. In addition, the negative accident 
rate in the 2nd to 4th retraining phases is a promising result. Although the first retraining 
phase is more vulnerable to accidents, it provides a chance to take more information 
about the response of the system. In fact, the chance of more wrong decisions in the 
initial learning phase is possible. Thereafter, this prior information is useful for the 
discrimination of faults and the prevention of accidents (or any unwanted situation).  
 
4.2. Detection of Flooding in a Column  
4.2.1. Flooding in de-Butanizer column  
The goal of this part is to evaluate the FD system by addressing a common reported fault 
of the chemical industry in a simulation environment. Distillation is a widespread unit 
operation, which is used to separate some components in a feed stream. Figure 9 
illustrates the basic components of a distillation system i.e. De-Butanizer.  
The vapor from the reboiler flows up the column, countercurrent to the liquid flowing 
down the column. The components in the feed stream (No. 1-2 in Fig. 9) are separated 
according to their relative volatilities. Butane is the most volatile component and tends to 
concentrate in the vapor flowing up the column. Components with lower volatility tend to 
concentrate in the liquid flowing down the column. Eventually, the vapor enriched in 
Butane exits from the top of the distillation column, and after passing the condenser is 
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collected in the reflux drum. A portion of the condensed liquid is fed back into the 
column. The rest of the liquid exits the process as the top product (Ludwig, 1997).  
Flooding is a common abnormal process condition that leads to poor separation and off 
specification products (Kister, 2006). In runaway flooding, the liquid level continues to 
rise, and if it is not stopped, the column can actually overflow. Furthermore, flooding 
causes overpressure in the column, which potentially leads to burst of the rupture disc 
and to have process downtime. Less frequently, vapor slugging through the liquid also 
cause trays uplift and damage.  
Flooding may happen due to an excess of hydraulic traffic across the column which is 
represented in Figure 10. Usually, one cause of flooding is too much reflux rate which 
interrupts mass balance. Since reflux is assumed as a heat sink, excess reflux also 
interrupts energy balance and disrupts temperature profile. Consequently, it leads to 
condense of vapor and increase of liquid level in a tray which makes flooding worse. An 
operator usually recognizes flooding through an increase of deferential pressure of the 
column. Thereafter, inevitable flaring of the off-specification products results in 
economic loss. Meanwhile, in order to recover the normal state, the manual corrective 
action is reconfiguration of controllers (Fig. 10). In other words, an operator moderates 
the fault by changing set points and retuning control loops which is assumed as a 
supervision control.  
Another cause of potential flooding is an increase of the relative vapor velocity (Fig. 10). 
Excess reboiler heat duty causes too much vapor to be boiled up, which increases the 
vapor flow up the column. This abnormal hydraulic traffic leads to an increase of the 
differential pressure, which is monitored by an operator. Although, a temporary 
perturbation via this pseudo-fault happens, flaring and corrective actions by an operator 
are not required in most of the cases. Since excess vapor in the column increase 
temperature of trays, a temperature controller automatically decreased the reboiler duty 
(Fig. 10). Thus, the state of column is automatically recovered to normal state in a short 
time. Generally, operator interaction with process in this case is sort of mislabeling the 
FD dataset.  
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4.2.2. Relabeling strategy  
 The dataset required for developing the FD system is provided by a simulation of the de-
Butanizer in the Dynamic Aspen-Plus environment. This complex case study includes 5 
closed control loops (Fig. 9). In order to resemble data streaming, the occurrence time of 
the fault is unknown. In other words, either the fault or the pseudo-fault is randomly 
triggered on unfixed time in each simulation run.  Records of 30 process variables are 
collected in the initial dataset: 
 0 00 1:3000 1:3000( , ) | 1:100 r rD Y F r  (13) 
The initial trained GNB classifier based on D0 is evaluated in terms of F1 and accuracy. 
In this order, the true labels are determined by the Kister-Hass factor (Kister, 1992) based 
on the hydraulic state of the de-Butanizer column. Then, the iterative procedure of FD is 
implemented. The results (Table 4) reveal that the final FD system produces higher 
accuracy than the sole classifier in the initialization. The rates of fault impacts, i.e. flaring 
and runaway flooding, are also decreased. Therefore, the proposed strategy promises a 
successive refinement of the datasets, and consequently an efficient diagnosis system. 
Regardless of the classifier types and the state space model, this positive trend is 
expected, because the strategy is focused on the refinement of attributes and labels.  
Table 4: Diagnosis performance of flooding using iterative procedure 
 Learning phase Initial 1st  2nd 3rd 4th 5th  6th  
 Iinteraction % 0 3 9 13 16 18 20 
F1 Normal 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.93 
Fault 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.90 
Accuracy 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.90 0.92 
TPR% 99.62 99.48 99.43 99.46 99.48 99.49 99.60 
FPR %  Unnecessary 
flaring  
31.03 20.69 18.17 15.98 13.51 
11.02 9.58 
FNR %  Runaway flooding  0.38 0.52 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.40 
 
It is worth to consider that the control loops in the process make it robust with regards to 
small perturbations due to a pseudo-fault. This robustness is a kind of passive fault-
tolerance (Patton, 2015). In this way, the interaction of an operator with the process is 
less demanded, which leads to lower potential human error. Consequently, the change of 
Iinteraction in sequential learning stages is smoother for closed loop systems rather than for 
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open loop ones. However, for a severe process fault exceeding this tolerance, the control 
system cannot compensate the fault. Thus, an active fault-tolerant system requires fault-
detection methods and a reconfiguration mechanism. 
Moreover, the correction factor of Iinteraction (Eq. 8) is a controller of the speed of learning. 
The less the plant can tolerate unwanted situations, the more the ARL and Iinteraction is 
reduced. In addition, an inaccurate classifier adversely impacts on the confidence of the 
FD system. Consequently, Iinteraction adjusts the extent of changes and the chance of wrong 
decisions. In general, learning from the experience improves operator understanding, and 
enhances the FD system. Certainly, there is a trade-off between the cost of learning (the 
cost of the risk, depending on the situation and the process) and the reward from learning 
(the better FD and flaring reduction, in this particular case). Optimization of this problem 
is beyond the scope of this work and deserves further research. 
 
4.2.3. Filtering strategy  
There are various strategies dealing with mislabeling (Frénay & Verleysen, 2014). The 
aim of this subsection is the comparison of the proposed approach with a filtering 
approach. In order to improve the quality of the training data, the samples with uncertain 
labels can be removed following the procedure described in Section 3.2 except Stages 3-
4. Alternatively, any sample inconsistently labelled by the operator and the classifier is 
omitted from the database. The idea is to refine the training data via selecting reliable 
samples; and to develop a more efficient classifier.  
The filtering strategy is iteratively implemented on the de-Butanizer dataset. Figure 11 
shows its performance in terms of accuracy, and it is compared with the proposed 
strategy. Despite the increasing trend of accuracy in sequential learning stages of the 
filtering strategy, but it is not as efficient as relabeling strategy. The main reason is that 
the relabeling strategy tries to consider the pseudo-fault as the normal state, despite the 
operator idea at the initial phase. Indeed, it is important to include the pseudo-fault subset 
into normal subsets, which leads to the improvement of the discrimination boundary. 
This strategy shows to have higher performance than discarding the pseudo-fault subset. 
As such, the FD system upgrades to distinguish pseudo-faults from risky faults. 
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4.3. Industrial Challenge  
The real nature of the problem is next illustrated in an industrial challenge, for which the 
methods and tools proposed are applied in a limited way. The problem is first described 
and next it is analysed in regard of the available information and the data processing 
produced for the first learning stage.  
Implementing the iterative strategy proposed in an industrial plant, and accordingly 
obtaining new data from it, is beyond the scope of this study since the necessary feedback 
cannot be afforded in the short term. Therefore, the results obtained reveal the 
opportunities to improve the operator decision-making, and indicate the course for further 
action. 
The removal of sour gas components from gas streams, using chemical solvents such as 
amines, is a requirement in most gas processing plants. The acid gas constituents (H2S 
and CO2) react with an aqueous solvent in a high-pressure absorber which is a column 
equipped with trays (Fig. 12). Subsequently, the solvent is directed to a regenerator and 
stripped from the acid gas in at elevated temperature to reuse it.  
One of the most frequent problems in a gas-sweetening unit is amine foaming in the 
absorber, which results in loss of proper vapor-liquid contact, solution hold up and poor 
solution distribution. The adverse consequences include off-specification product, 
excessive amine loss, reduced gas-treating capacity, and energy loss. For resolving the 
problem, antifoam is injected into the amine recirculation system at several sensitive 
points. Antifoams are chemicals formulated to allow expansion of liquid film of amine 
bubbles and formation of thin spots, which subsequently lead to rupture of bubbles 
(Sheilan, Spooner, Street, & van Hoorn, 2005). 
In practice, the operator monitors online data to estimate the state of the system. The 
following symptoms are usually helpful to the operator for foaming detection: 
 Fluctuating pressure drop in the absorber  
 Increase of flash gas  
 Amine carryover from absorber or flash tank 
 Swinging liquid levels in any vessel 
 Decrease in H2S removal with increase in CO2 removal 
 Off-specification treated gas 
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Furthermore, it is possible to get samples of the amine solution to check foaming 
potential using the shake test. However, this offline test is not common due to delay in 
getting results and hazard of sour gas in the amine solution. On the other hand, 
developing an accurate first principle model of this industrial process is impracticable. As 
such, achieving true labels regarding the dataset is almost challenging. Therefore, online 
monitoring and state estimation typically is preferred to redundant shake test, which is 
herein required for validation.  
In case of severe foaming, the operator can inject fast and massive antifoam by a 
centrifugal pump. Indeed, an online foaming sensor and a close control loop are not 
available in the plant. On the other hand, the operator may be misled by temporary 
pressure fluctuation of the absorber column due to vortex of liquid in the bottom of the 
column (a pseudo- fault). Then, unnecessary antifoam injection by an operator can lead to 
long-term process drawbacks, such as the reduction of amine filter efficiency or the 
formation of heat stable salts. Wrong decision-making leads to extra costs, direct and 
indirect, including antifoam consumption, more frequent filter maintenance, and 
corrosion due to salts. Therefore, it is required that the operator makes right decisions 
regarding the convenience of antifoam injection (Kister, 2006; Sheilan, et al., 2005).  
An efficient FD system can aid the operator to deal with this dilemma. First, records of 
26 in-situ sensors of pressure, level, flow and temperature in significant parts of the gas-
sweetening unit of a real plant are provided. An initial dataset including observations and 
operator labels is as follows: 
 0 00 1:4000 1:4000( , ) | 1: 24 r rD Y F r  (14) 
The GNB classifier is fitted based on the training subset of D0.  In order to evaluate 
performance, the 3-folded cross-validation is implemented. The cross validation is 
important to check the classification robustness against the particular choice for the 
training and testing datasets. The predicted labels of the testing subset are compared with 
the true labels, which have been achieved according to the shake tests (Table 5). 
Thereafter, the conflict between operator labels and FD predictions is investigated. 
Iinteraction reveals the existence of unnecessary actions and indicates a promising 
opportunity for improving FD in further refining phases. In addition, the low standard 
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deviation values () of the 3-folded validation (Table 5) show the stability of the 
classifier in prediction.  
Table 5: The initial learning phase of the foaming detection system 
 Iinteraction Accuracy 
1st fold 0.8382  0.6246 
2nd fold 0.8322 0.6218 
3rd fold 0.8384 0.6291 
3-folded Validation [µ,] [ 0.8332,0.0031] [0.6251,0.0052] 
 
In order to improve the performance of the initial FD system, its implementation in the 
industrial plant is required, so that new datasets can be generated. However, this is highly 
resource consuming and getting more information from industrial practice, this is beyond 
the scope of the work presented. On the other hand, this case study highlights the 
industrial challenges of operator-process interaction on FD, and the significance of this 
problem, which clearly needs more attention and further investigation. 
  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This work addresses efficient data-driven FD for complex chemical processes in the 
framework of operational intelligence, for which the effect of the inevitable operator-
process interaction on process history records needs to be taken into account.  
On the one hand, prior operator knowledge is required, as well as operator preventive 
actions, which are in turn considered true indications of faulty situations. However, some 
historical records in the database may be mislabeled due to human error. This has an 
adverse impact on the performance of an automatic FD system based on such data and 
such labels. On the other hand, the operator actions, necessary or not, alter the system 
dynamics and may interrupt the recording of process data (dynamic attributes) 
corresponding to a true fault. 
Results of the illustrative CSTR case study showed that the GNB classifier trained based 
on the initial dataset just provides a model of operator preferences. Furthermore, it also 
showed that this policy incurred in unnecessary utility consumption. Thus, there was a 
motivation to provide refined datasets by managing label uncertainty and dynamic 
attributes of the system.  
23 
 
In order to resolve mentioned FD challenge, an iterative framework was proposed. 
Relabeling was done based on the estimation of the underlying state and a discrimination 
criteria defined as median of Mahalanobis distance. In addition, operator behavior toward 
the system was also shown to improve by considering the interaction index and an 
acceptable risk level. Indeed, this procedure provided the chance of generating new 
attributes at each training phase.  
The FD system was developed and tested for a CSTR and flooding of a simulated de-
Butanizer column. Iterative retraining of the GNB classifier through successive refined 
datasets led to higher detection performance in terms of accuracy and F1. The proposed 
FD system aided the operator to make better decisions in regard of the extra cost 
connected to unnecessary actions. Furthermore, the results revealed that the proposed FD 
strategy is more efficient than the filtering strategy. Nevertheless, collecting new 
information on the system response in the absence of operator actions was shown to be at 
expense of increased accident rate in the early phases of learning, as should be expected 
in regard of natural learning. Thereafter, this information was shown to be useful for 
more efficient discrimination in further learning phases, which leaded to decreasing rate 
of accidents (or unwanted situations). The cost of learning, and the trade-off with the 
associated risks and losses, suggests a challenging optimization problem and further 
research lines including incremental learning can be envisaged from this work. Thus, 
more parameters need to be involved; e.g. fault intensity and its consequences. 
Furthermore, a foaming case study in a gas refinery introduces an industrial challenge 
which reveals that FD under operator-process interaction is an important open research 
problem. However, the cost of obtaining data from true faulty situations in industrial 
practice is difficult. 
Finally, the main issue in this work was fault detection, which is a binary classification 
(normal - abnormal). A limitation of the proposed scheme is the incapacity of dealing 
with multiple faults, which needs more general discrimination boundaries. In fact, the 
bottleneck is the criteria based on Mahalanobis distance which is binary. In addition, for 
fault prognosis, it is required to include additional modules into the proposed framework 
in a further work.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
a  number of true positive samples 
a’   number of faulty samples by the operator and the classifier  
b  number of false positive samples  
b’  number of samples diagnosed as faulty in contrast with operator  opinion  
c  number of false negative samples 
c’  number of samples labeled faulty by operator but not diagnosed  
CA  concentration of A in the outlet stream 
CAf  concentration of A in the feed stream 
CB  concentration of B in the outlet stream 
d  number of true negative samples  
d’ number of samples which both the operator and the classifier have 
agreement on no fault happened. 
DM  Mahalanobis distance 
Dp   dataset at each phase 
F   fault  
Ft  identification matrices of observation equation 
Gt  identification matrices of state equation 
Iinteraction interaction index 
m   number of attributes 
pth   counter of phase 
R   number of runs 
rth   counter of runs 
T   temperature of the reactor 
t   time  
T  time horizon 
Tf  temperature of the inlet stream 
Tj  temperature of the jacket   
vt  Gaussian random vectors of observation equation 
Vt  variance matrices of observation equation 
wt  Gaussian random vectors of state equation   
Wt  variance matrices of state equation 
Yt  attributes 
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Greek symbol 
θt  state variables 
Σ  covariance matrix 
µ   mean  
  standard deviation  
π  probability  
Acronyms 
ASM   abnormal situation management  
ARL  acceptable risk level 
CSTR  continuous stirred tank reactor 
DLM  dynamic linear model 
FD  fault detection  
FDA   Fisher discriminant analysis  
FPR  false positive rate 
FNR  false negative rate 
GNB  Gaussian naïve Bayes 
HMM   hidden Markov model  
KPI  key performance indicator 
MLE   maximum likelihood estimation 
PCA   principal component analysis  
PID  proportional, integral and derivative  
PLS   partial least squares  
SVM  support vector machines  
TPR  true positive rate 
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APPENDIX 
A.1. Energy and mass balances equation of the CSTR 
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Table 6: CSTR model parameters 
Volumetric flowrate (m3/s) F=1 
Forward activation energy 
(J/mol) 
Ef=49614 
Volume of CSTR (m3) V = 150 
Reverse activation energy 
(J/mol) 
Er=50242 
Density of A-B mixture (kg/m3) ρ =833  
Forward  pre-exponential 
factor (1/s) 
kf0= 
3.4·107 
Specific heat of A-B mixture 
(J/kg·K) 
Cp = 0.12 
Reverse pre-exponential factor 
(1/s) 
kr0 =2·107 
 Heat of reaction (J/mol) H=-5960 
Overall heat transfer 
coefficient (W/m2·K) 
U=7 
Universal gas constant (J/mol·K) R=8.31451  Area (m2) A=100 
A.2. Recursive Kalman filter of DLM 
Consider the DLM specified by: 
 t t t tY F vθ  ~ (0, )t m tv N V  (17) 
1 t t t tG wθ θ  ~ (0, )t n tw N W                     (18) 
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Let consider: 
1 1: 1 1 1| ~ ( , )   t t t tY N m Cθ   (19) 
Then the following statements hold. 
(i) The one-step-ahead predictive distribution of θt given Y1:t-1 is Gaussian, with 
parameters 
1: 1 1( | )  t t t t ta E Y G mθ   (20) 
1: 1 1( | )    t t t t t t tR Var Y G C G Wθ   (21) 
(ii) The one-step-ahead predictive distribution of Yt given Y1:t-1 is Gaussian, with 
parameters 
1: 1( | ) t t t t tf E Y Y Fa   (22) 
1: 1( | )   t t t t t t tQ Var Y Y F R F V   (23) 
(iii) The filtering distribution of θt given Y1:t is Gaussian, with parameters 
1
1: 1( | )


  t t t t t t t tm E Y a R FQ eθ  (24) 
1
1:( | )
  t t t t t t t t tC Var Y R R FQ F Rθ  (25) 
where et=Yt-ft is the forecast error. 
 
B. Supplementary data 
Datasets associated with this article including CSTR and gas-sweetening unit 
measurements can be found, in the online version.  
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